In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality.
Introduction
New game-theoretic models of elections extend the standard Downsian model to account for two components in a vote choice. The …rst component is the ideological distance between voters and candidates, a mainstay of the Downsian model [Downs (1957) ]. The second component is a voter's perceived qualities of the candidates, which summarizes all non-ideological factors a¤ecting the vote choice, like competence, charisma and the moral attributes of the candidates.
A natural question in the light of these models is how important ideology is in a vote choice. This paper identi…es two sources of omitted variable bias when estimating a voter's sensitivity to ideological di¤erence caused by treating candidate quality as exogenous. First, high quality candidates may be more persuasive than their rivals, thereby drawing voters closer to their policy position and decreasing ideological distance. Next, a candidate's observed policy position is the result of a strategic encounter. Therefore, a candidate's announced policy position, in equilibrium, is a function of his rivals'policy positions and qualities as well as the candidate's own quality. Our main contribution is to estimate the extended Downsian model addressing these two biases.
The main parameters of interest are the relative weight of ideology to other non-ideological factors in the vote choice, and the perceived qualities of the candidates. Two estimation challenges are addressed. First, the voter's observed ideology may be correlated with the unobserved perceived qualities of the candidates. Intuitively, a high quality candidate may be more persuasive than his lower quality rivals leading voters to choose his position as "the right one." High quality candidates are capable of drawing voters closer to their ideological position, thereby reducing the ideological distance. A naive estimation capturing the weight of ideological distance in the voter's choice may overstate the true e¤ect. If the quality of the candidate is both unobserved and negatively corre-1 lated with ideological distance, then a small di¤erence in ideology is overstated in the voter utility function for high quality candidates.
The second estimation challenge addresses the correlation between candidate quality and the announced policy position. If a candidate chooses his policy announcement strategically, then, in equilibrium, the candidate's announcement is a function of his rivals'qualities as well as his own. The expected direction of the bias is dependent on the theoretical framework adopted. The game-theoretic models by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Aragones and Palfrey (2007) , together with simulations provided by Scho…eld and Sened (2006) suggest that, in equilibrium, candidates with quality advantages tend to locate closer to the electoral center.
1 In their theoretical framework, a naive estimation of the model tends to exaggerate the true importance of ideology in the voter's choice.
However, these studies assume that voters have identical perceptions of the candidates' qualities, which is strongly rejected in our empirical analysis. For this reason, we provide a new, simple game-theoretic model that better accommodates the data. In our model, voters are allowed to di¤er in their quality perceptions. Also, candidates are allowed to microtarget their announcements such that groups of voters with di¤erent quality perceptions receive a (somewhat) di¤erent message, at a certain cost to the candidate. Microtargeting is a technique that tailors the electoral message to a subpopulation of voters based on unique information about that group. 2 The tailored message is delivered using various means of communication, such as direct mail, phone calls, home visits, radio ads, and television ads. Since communication is expensive, candidates may …nd it optimal to spend money only, or mainly, on voters with a high rate of return. For example, a candidate may not …nd it optimal to invest in voters whose preferences match very well with his political platform, because those voters are already likely to vote for him. Instead, the candidate can use those resources to microtarget voters whose support he needs to win the election and whose policy preferences are less congruent with his political platform. We …nd that candidates behave in this fashion in equilibrium within our theoretical setting. The testable implication is that a naive estimation of the model tends to understate the true importance of ideology in the voter's choice, compared to a model in which the omitted variable problem is resolved.
The endogeneity in voter ideology has been previously discussed in Degan (2007) , but the solution of the problem is out of the scope of her paper. To the best of our knowledge, the endogeneity problem in candidate's ideology has not been addressed in the voting literature, despite being an analog to the endogeneity of …rm location and price in models of di¤erentiated products within the industrial organization literature. 3 The key insight is that the observed position of a candidate (the location of a …rm) results from the equilibrium of a strategic interaction which has as primitives the quality of the candidates (the attributes of the di¤erentiated products). Firms who produce high quality products set higher prices. It should be no surprise that high-quality candidates enjoy some strategic advantage, too.
This paper contributes to the voting literature in three ways. First, we identify a new omitted variable bias (in addition to the one pointed out in Degan (2007)). Second, we present a formal model whose assumptions accommodate the data and whose results give an unambiguous direction of the bias for the new omitted variable bias. Third, we propose two sets of instrumental variables to address both biases simultaneously, and estimate the model. Our empirical estimates are in full agreement with the predictions of the theoretical framework for both problems.
The proposed model is estimated using data from two time periods: (1) the 2000 U.S. Presidential election and (2) the 1896 US Presidential Election. The 2000 general election was contested between George Bush (the winner) and Al
Gore. In the Democratic primary, Al Gore's main competitor was Bill Bradley.
In the Republican primary, George Bush's main competitor was John McCain.
The endogeneity problem in voter ideology is addressed using vote share of the The set of instruments used to address candidate policy position endogeneity are drawn from the industrial organization literature. In this literature, a product's price in market j is instrumented by using rivals'prices from markets outside of market j. These prices do not a¤ect consumer demand in market j, but are correlated with the underlying cost structure for the products in this market. Therefore, these prices are also correlated with the …rm's price in market j. In the election market, we consider a primary rival's ideology from the opposing party as an instrument for the presidential candidates'perceived ideology. For example, the ideological position of Bradley is used to instru- The use of these instruments addresses one potential source of endogeneity in a candidate's policy position. A second source to consider is microtargeting within a market. Both Gore and Bradley may take more liberal positions in counties that are traditionally more democratic, but appear more conservative in counties that are traditionally conservative (or Republican). Di¤erences in voter ideology by county provides an incentive for candidates to deviate from their national message. 4 We address this issue by constructing the proposed instrument using only voters'perceptions from outside of the county. The perceived policy position of candidate j by voters not residing in county k is correlated with the perceived policy position of voters in county k, but uncorrelated with "microtargeting" e¤orts within county k.
Our …ndings are as follows. First, as our previous discussion suggests, once the endogeneity in the ideology of voters is removed, ideological distance becomes less relevant in explaining vote choice than suggested by naive models.
Second, unlike pre-existenting game-theoretic models of voting, when the endogeneity in the candidate ideology is removed, ideological distance becomes much more relevant in explaining vote choice than suggested by naive models. The latter e¤ect is the dominating bias. Therefore, when one accounts for these endogeneity problems ideological distance becomes more relevant. Further, these estimates support the idea that candidates avoid microtargeting voters that ex-ante are more likely to support them. Instead, they use their resources to microtarget swing voters that ex-ante are less likely to support them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple game between two candidates whose problem is to optimally allocate microtargeting resources. Section 3 discusses two endogeneity biases present in the estimation of spatial voting models. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the methodology. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
Voting with microtargeting
Consider the following two-stage game with two o¢ ce seeking candidates. In period one, based on his quality and his rival's quality, each candidate chooses a general announcement, i.e. a policy position that is automatically and costlessly delivered to all voters. In period 2, the candidates have the opportunity to microtarget any particular voter at a certain cost, subject to a budget constraint.
Microtargeting may be either (i) a tailored message that moves the candidate closer to the voter on ideological grounds or (ii) propaganda that enhances the voter's perception of the quality of the candidate.
Such game seems to be a reasonable description of actual electoral contests.
The two-stage game is solved backwards. For every possible pro…le of general announcements, there is a subgame that begins in period 2. The solution to the last-stage of the game sheds light on how candidates allocate resources to microtarget voters, conditional on a particular pro…le of general announcements.
We focus on the second stage of the game where candidates make optimal choices 6 on microtargeting.
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Consider two candidates who seek to win o¢ ce, L and R, and …ve groups of voters. The utility received by voter group i from candidate j is given by
The deterministic component a ij represents the exogenous utility that voter i gets from candidate j. This component aggregates all dimensions relevant to the vote, including ideology and perceived quality of the candidate, b ij is another deterministic component of utility, but, unlike the exogenous a ij , b ij is chosen by candidate j. It represents the utility that candidate j gives voter i based on spending resources in microtargeting, either to make voter speci…c announcements or to enhance voter i's perception of candidate j's quality.
6
Each candidate j has a budget constraint, B j , which represents the amount of resources available to spend in microtargeting the voters. The stochastic component e j represents a quality shock that takes place after the candidates decided b ij for every j; but before the election takes place. Hence, candidate j chooses b ij for every i without observing " L and " R , although he knows the distribution from which they are drawn.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, candidates and voters observe a ij for every i and j: Second, after observing a ij for every i and every j; each candidate j chooses b ij for every i subject to his budget constraint
5 Of course, the solution to our model could be in turn used to …nd the optimal general announcements. We would just have to …nd the pro…le of general announcements that is a sub-game perfect equilibirum. However, we do not need to solve the larger game to answer our question. 6 Microtargeting can be perceived as goodwill advertising for the candidate. 
so that
and
The probability of victory of candidate j,
, is the probability of obtaining more than 50% of the vote.
In the model, group 1 and group 5 are partisan (non-swing) voters. These groups are modelled by setting a 1L and a 5R high enough so that for any value in Proposition The unique Nash equilibrium of the game is b L ; b R such that
Proof. In Appendix.
The equilibrium vector of strategies in the proposition resembles the argument that maximizes a Rawlsian social welfare function (RSWF). A RSWF is maximized when the utility of the individual with lowest utility is maximized.
In the proposition above, each candidate maximizes his probability of victory when he maximizes the utility of the voter with the lowest relative utility among all the voters in his minimum winning coalition. Interestingly, the "egalitarian solution" in the proposition results from the behavior of self-interested agents (candidates maximizing their expected probability of victory) rather than the imposition of a positive postulate (as occurs with the RSWF).
The following corollary o¤ers further insight on the equilibrium strategies of the candidates.
Corollary
In equilibrium,
Proof. Derives immediately from the proposition and its proof.
Corollary i states the following: Voters 1 and 5 are partisan such that spending resources on them would be wasteful. Therefore, spending money in building a coalition that is not minimal (more than three voters) would be wasteful. Candidate L needs the support of voters 2 and 3 in addition to voter 1 to meet the minimum coalition size that secures victory; Candidate R needs the support of voters 3; 4; and 5 to meet the minimum coalition size. In equilibrium, all the candidates'resources must be allocated to appeal these voters.
Corollary ii says that among the voters that belong to their minimum winning coalition, each candidate spends more money in those that have the lowest ex-ante relative utility. Hence, in equilibrium u o ij and b ij must be negatively correlated. In other words, candidate L spends more resources in voter 3 than in voter 2, and candidate R spends more resources in voter 3 than in voter 4.
Note, this is not due to the fact that voter 3 has greater decision power relative to voters 2 and 4, but to the fact that voter 3 is more likely to swing after the random shock e L e R occurs. Among all voters, 3 is ex-ante most indi¤erent between both candidates. The implication that u o ij and b ij must be negatively correlated is the focus of our empirical research. The remaining sections of this paper are devoted to testing this implication.
Corollary iii states that, as a result of the equilibrium strategies, voters with higher a iL a iR end up with at least the same relative utility u iL u iR than voters with lower a iL a iR . There is no di¤erence in payo¤ between being supported by only one and only two voters. Hence, the candidates tend to equate the utilities from the two swing voters closest to them. They do this to avoid the risk of ending up with only the partisan vote. Note, if the budget is large enough, each candidate allocates money such that his two recipients get exactly the same relative utility. In this case, the result will be u 2L u 2R = u 3L u 3R
and u 3R u 3L = u 4R u 4L , and so ju iL u iR j = k 0 for every i: found that one of the worst groups in Florida for Gore was young white men, but also that they could be moved by a message about protecting the Everglades." (Svodoba, 2008) 7 Same will happen if the voters consider that the candidates are close (enough) substitutes.
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3 Two endogeneity biases
Consider a model with I voters and 2 o¢ ce-motivated candidates. Let i and j index voters and candidates, respectively. Each voter has a preferred ideological position, x i ; within the traditional liberal-conservative space. 8 Candidates announce their ideological positions simultaneously. We allow voters to have di¤erent perceptions of a candidate's ideological position. We use z ij to denote voter i 0 s perception of the policy position announced by candidate j. The utility that voter i receives from voting for candidate j in election n is given by
where j is a kx1-vector that represents the in ‡uence of various sociodemographic variables in the choice for party j; i is a 1xk-vector describing sociodemographic characteristics of voter i, the operator jj jj is the Euclidean norm, and the parameter > 0 captures voter's sensitivity to distance between a candidate's policy position and their own. The term ij represents all the characteristics of candidate j not captured by policy position, as perceived by voter i. We think of ij as voter i's perception of candidate j 0 s quality. Finally, the model is stochastic because it includes an idiosyncratic taste shock, " ijn , which represents a shock to voter utility for candidate j. Although " ijn is unobserved, the candidates are assumed to know the distribution from which this value is drawn. Hence, the quality of candidate j is the sum of a deterministic and a stochastic component, ij + " ijn .
Endogenous ideology of the candidates
Consider the benchmark model in which the perceptions of the policy announcements from each candidate are identical across voters, that is, z ij = z j for every i 2 I: Each candidate maximizes his probability of victory subject to the parameters of the model (his quality, his rivals' qualities, the distribution of voter ideology, and voter sociodemographic characteristics) and the policy positions chosen by his rivals. An equilibrium of the game, denoted by z 1 ; : : : ; z J , is a strategy pro…le such that, given rivals'strategies, each candidate maximizes his expected probability of victory.
Whenever the candidates have identical qualities, j = for all j; the equilibrium is given by the well-known "median-voter theorem" where both candidates announce the policy position preferred by the median voter. 9 Instead, consider a scenario where, without loss of generalization, candidate 1 has a quality advantage over candidate 2 ( 1 > 2 ). Palfrey (2004, 2002 ) use a deterministic model (" ijn .is set to zero for all i, j and n) to demonstrate that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. In mixed strategies, candidate 1 announces a policy close to the electoral center and candidate 2 moves to the periphery of the electoral space. We refer to this outcome as the homogenous quality divergence hypothesis, which says, when quality perceptions are homogenous across voters, the higher quality candidate is more likely to locate close to the electoral center than the lower quality candidate. Intuitively, if the low quality candidate moves close to the electoral center, the two candidates become close substitutes along ideological grounds and voters then base their decision on quality, leaving the low quality candidate with no support at all.
Even when j is unobserved, the parameters and j can be estimated using limited dependent models like conditional multinomial logit and probit.
However, if the homogenous quality divergence hypothesis holds, then, in equilibrium, the announcement of a high-quality candidate is more centrist, and hence closer to the bulk of voters than the announcement of a lower quality rival. Failure to account for the unobserved error component of utility, j , causes an omitted variable bias in the estimate of towards positive in…nite.
In contrast, consider a scenario where candidates can microtarget their messages at a certain cost. A plausible way to model microtargeting is to allow the position of candidate j as perceived by voter i to depend on candidate j's investment on individualizing his message for voter i: Hence, in this setting, the utility can be re-written as
where z ij ( ) is voter's i perception of candidate's j policy position. A candidate's perceived policy position is a function of the money spent by candidate j on microtargeting voter i, m ij . Since microtargeting is costly, candidates optimally spend their resources in voters with a high return rate. Candidate j invests more resources to microtarget his policy announcement to those swing voters that are less likely to vote for him based on non-ideological factors. A swing voter who is unlikely to vote for candidate j based on the candidate's perceived quality may be a better investment than a voter who already believes the candidate to be of high quality. A tailored message may su¢ ce to make the …rst voter support the candidate. The marginal bene…t of investing more resources into the second voter, who is likely to support the candidate, may be small. This leads to the heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis, which says if quality perceptions are heterogenous across voters, then as a candidate's quality increases, as perceived by the voter, the expected ideological distance 14 between them increases. The candidate is less inclined to spend resources to microtarget a voter who already perceives him to be of high quality. Note, the heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis is in full agreement with the equilibrium found above in the proposition. The portions of utility i j + ij and jjx i z ij (m ij )jj are the analog to a ij and b ij in equation 1, respectively.
Under this speci…cation, candidate j spends money m ij on voter i with the aim to move the voter's perceived policy position of the candidate closer to the voter i's most-preferred policy.
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The homogenous quality divergence hypothesis and the heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis yield almost opposite predictions. The homogenous quality divergence hypothesis predicts that a high quality candidate is likely to be ideologically close to (the bulk of) the voters. The heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis predicts that a candidate is likely to be ideologically far from those voters that consider him to be a high quality candidate. If the heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis holds, then a naive estimation where ij is omitted biases towards negative in…nite because quality perceptions and probability of vote are positively correlated. Eventually, a naive estimation may yield a negative value of , as if ideological distance were to increase the utility level. An instrumental variable for z ij can solve this endogeneity problem.
We propose using the policy position associated with candidate j 0 s rival in the primary as an instrument for candidate j's rival in the general election.
In the industrial organization literature, …rms make pricing and production decisions strategically, i.e., conditional on the pricing and production decisions 1 0 An alternative speci…cation of equation 4 is
Under this alternative speci…cation of u ij (x i ; z j ); jjx i z ij jj + i j and ij (m ij ) would be the analog to a ij and b ij in equation 1, respectively. Here, candidate j spends money m ij with the aim to enhance voter i's perceived quality of candidate j. Both speci…cations lead to the same conclusions. Our empirical strategy does not allow us to support one speci…cation or the other. Scho…eld (2006) Although the proposed instrument should correct for endogeneity associated with the homogenous quality divergence hypothesis, the instrument may still be correlated with microtargeting. There still exists the possibility that, say, Gore and Bradley's received messages are correlated with Bush's received message.
This strategy may occur if candidates tailor their messages at the state or county level. For example, not only Gore and Bradley, but Bush as well, may attempt to move their platforms to the left when they address their messages to voters in Massachusetts. Therefore, the instrument is constructed using rivals'policy positions as perceived by voters not in the same election market as voter i (i.e., di¤erent states or counties). The modi…ed instrument is independent of candidate j's unobserved quality as perceived by voter i because voter i 0 s ideology does not a¤ect the instrument. Further, the modi…ed instrument is independent of local ideological preference, which change as a result of the candidates tailoring their messages to speci…c audiences.
Endogenous ideology of the voters
Implicit in the previous model is the assumption that voter's preferences are independent of a candidate's policy position. This assumption underestimates the role of deliberation and public discussion in a democracy. In pre-electoral debates, voters'policy preferences are yet to be "formed", among other reasons because new information will ‡ow. The candidates'announcements are usually followed by explanations, arguments, and discussion to persuade the voters. It is plausible to think that high quality candidates are more e¤ective in convincing voters that their policy positions are better than their lower quality rivals.
We refer to this phenomena as the deliberation hypothesis. The utility function accounts for this hypothesis by allowing voter ideology, x i ( ), to be a function of candidates'qualities.
The deliberation hypothesis implies that, in a naive estimation where ij is omitted, the estimate of is biased. The strong correlation is driven by time invariant preferences that are location speci…c.
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Variables obtained from these two sources are summarized in Table 1 . A total of 540 voters are available in the PEW survey. The paper focuses on voters of the two major parties, which drops the total number of observations to 518.
In observable characteristics, there are several di¤erences in the average voter pro…le between candidates, which are statistically signi…cant at the 5% level.
Voters who support Bush are more likely to be married, white, and homeowners.
Further, Bush supporters view Gore as being more liberal than Gore supporters do. On the other hand, Gore supporters have ideologies that are more liberal than Bush supporters and are more likely to live in a city. In this survey, 314 individuals state they will vote for Bush, which leads to a vote share of 58%. 
Empirical Model
We index elections using n. Each voter is observed to vote in three elections:
Democratic primary (n = 1), Republican primary (n = 2), and General Election (n = 3). Each election consists of a choice between only two candidates. All candidates are involved in one primary, but only the winners of the primaries (Gore and Bush) move to the general election. The index j denotes the candidates. To save notation, the values that j takes are election speci…c, i.e. the same individual competing in two di¤erent elections is assigned di¤erent values.
These values are given in the following chart. 
Given the distributional assumption of " ijn ; the probability of selecting candidate j in election n is given by the mixed logit probability [Mcfadden 1973 ].
Pr(jj
Instead of a simple binary choice, the voter's likelihood contribution must capture the voter's joint decision across the three elections. A voter's likelihood contribution conditional on the unobserved quality shock for all candidates is the product of probabilities given by equation (7) over all elections
Pr(jj ; ij ) yijn where y ijn takes the value of 1 if voter i chooses candidate j in election n and 0 otherwise, and y i is a vector summarizing the vote decision in each election for each candidate.
1 9 The variance parameter is normalized to unity in estimation.
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Identi…cation
There exist several challenges in identifying all the parameters of the model.
First, the discrete choice framework only allows for the identi…cation of relative di¤erences in utility. For this reason, the utility received from voting for Bradley is normalized to u i;Bradley = jx i z i;Bradley j. Note, with the exception of , all the taste parameters and the unobserved quality shock, ij , are set to zero.
The scaling parameter of the idiosyncratic error, " ijn ; is set to = 1:
Second, the random e¤ect capturing a candidate's quality would typically be identi…ed using panel data over time for the same voter. Jointly estimating a voter's choices over the three elections behaves similarly to observing the same voter over three time periods. The parameters associated with the random effects are identi…ed via variation in vote choice among observationally equivalent voters.
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Lastly, the parameter associated with sensitivity to ideological di¤erences,
; is potentially biased. We allow for endogeneity in both voter ideology and candidate's policy position as being correlated with the unobserved candidate quality. Our method to control for endogeneity follows the limited information maximum likelihood approach introduced in Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) and Newey (1985 Newey ( , 1987 . We use the following linear equation to estimate the relative distance in ideology between candidates and voters Ideological distance between candidates and voters is always a non-negative number. Given the assumption of a normally distributed error it is possible to have negative predicted values for Ideological distance. We provide estimates in Table 8 where the di¤erence in log distance is used instead. The results remain robust to this speci…cation.
2 3 An alternative IV approach is to estimate separate IV models for candidate position, z ij , and voter ideology, x i , then …nd the predicted residual as b e ij = jx i z ij j jb x i b z ij j; but this methods is less e¢ cient because it does not use both set of instruments jointly.
2 4 The proposed static model assumes candidates are not forward looking. If candidates are forward looking, then the validity of the candidate speci…c instruments is weakend because each candidate would then select an ideological position conditional on all rivals'qualities and positions.
2 5 Table A1 and the parameters that maximize this function are called the SML estimates.
proposed instruments and the endogenous variables.
Results
The standard logit estimates, which do not control for endogeneity or unobserved heterogeneity, are found in Table 2 . These baseline estimates are used to compare the outcomes from models that include instruments and unobserved heterogeneity. Note, the taste coe¢ cients associated with Bradley have been normalized to zero. Hence, the interpretation of the taste parameters are viewed as being relative to Bradley. In the baseline model, voters are found to be sensitive to ideological di¤erences. These results are consistent with previous studies of voting behavior [see Alvarez and Nagler (1998) and union membership (decreases vote share).
The …rst extension of the baseline model includes the use of unobserved candidate speci…c shocks. Table 3 The increased size of the coe¢ cients is suggestive evidence that the unobserved error is not only composed of random shocks, but candidate speci…c shocks play an important role.
A small share of the increase in may not be due to re-scaling, but to an omitted variable bias. If we observed an individual who is ideologically similar to a candidate, but instead votes for the rival, then it must imply this voter received a very low quality shock from the ideologically closer candidate. Alternatively, if we observe a voter who is ideologically far from the candidate, but the voter still chooses the candidate, then the voter received a very high quality shock. In both instances, the naive estimation fails to account for the unobserved shocks in quality and interprets these actions as low sensitivity to ideological di¤erences.
For all three candidates, we …nd the unobserved variance to be statistically di¤erent than zero. Gore is found to have the largest variance followed by Bush and McCain. Since Gore served as Vice President for eight years, the variation about his quality is likely to be associated to heterogenous judgements rather than uncertainty on the part of the voters. A likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of all the unobserved variances being equal to zero at the 1% 2 8 The Student T statistic on the estimate di¤erence in across models is 3.84.
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level.
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Second, the existence of signi…cant unobserved heterogeneity across voters suggests that the heterogenous quality divergency hypothesis may play a role.
Indeed, comparing Table 3 and Table 4 , we see that using instrumental variables to remove the endogeneity in the position of the candidates yields a much larger in absolute value estimate of the importance in ideological di¤erences.
Speci…cally, increases from ( 0:9210) to ( 1:3576) or an increase of 47.4%.
The di¤erence in estimates is signi…cant at the 1% level. 30 A simple comparison of the coe¢ cients of Table 3 and Table 4 shows that the increase in beta is not due to re-scaling. In fact, most of the signi…cant coe¢ cients are smaller in magnitude in the IV model with unobserved heterogeneity than in the unobserved heterogeneity only model.
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The estimated correlation coe¢ cients, id;j , which measure the level of endogeneity between candidate quality and ideological distance, are all found to be positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. A likelihood test rejects the null hypothesis that all the correlation coe¢ cients are equal to zero at the 1% level. 32 Therefore, as the unobservable quality increases so does ideological distance. These results provide further evidence in support of the heterogeneous divergence hypothesis (and contradicts the homogenous divergence hypothesis).
Candidates can still obtain the vote from voters who are ideologically distant when those voters perceive the candidate to be of high quality.
To this point we have implicitly adopted the accepted assumption that candidates are strictly o¢ ce-motivated. One can argue that candidates may also have policy preferences. Under this assumption, the cost of moving away from a candidate's most-preferred position would be a potential confounder in the A candidate who has a lower cost of deviating from their ideal policy position is capable of being more strategic as is the case with McCain. Therefore, a possible reason we …nd a heterogenous e¤ect across candidates is that each candidate has a di¤erent cost of deviating from their ideal points. Levitt (1996) …nds a similar result in the voting record of senators where the senator's ideal policy position is the driving factor behind their vote.
As a robustness check, we provide estimates for two alternative metrics of ideological distance. The …rst metric uses the squared di¤erence in ideology.
Initially, Hotelling (1929) Table 6 . Again, the correlation coe¢ cients, id;j ; are all found to be positive and statistically signi…cant suggesting that ideological distance remains endogenous.
Next, we conduct the following exercise to identify the existence of both voter endogeneity and candidate endogeneity. The instrumental variables model is estimated twice under di¤erent assumptions. First, the model is estimated only using candidate speci…c instruments to remove the endogeneity in ideological distance. Then, the model is estimated using only voter speci…c instruments for the measure of ideological distance. In each case, all the parameters in the utility function are estimated. These estimates from this exercise are found in Tables 7.   33 When only candidate speci…c instruments are used the estimate for increases by more than the coe¢ cient found when using both types of in- Table 7 . Although, all the correlation coe¢ cients are found to be positive, which is in support of the heterogeneous divergence hypothesis, none are statistically di¤erent from zero.
The absence of swing voters lessens the incentive to microtarget because voter who are ideologically close to you are su¢ ciently far from your rival and remain as strong supporters.
Conclusion
The outcome of a democratic election depends on the ideological stances of the voters and the candidates. In the democratic game, candidates undertake the dual task of adopting optimal ideological stands and persuading voters that their positions are better than their rivals'. Our main conclusion is that both the voters'and the candidates'ideological stances are the result of a complex game whose primitives are the voters'perceptions of candidates'qualities. Two e¤ects are observed and measured. First, the candidates personalize their messages to the voters. Since the personalization of the message is economically costly, the candidates choose the optimal degree of personalization based on the voters' perception of the candidate's quality. In particular, candidates do not waste resources trying to persuade voters that are already likely to vote for them on non-ideological grounds. They save those resources to deliver a personalized message to those voters that are less likely to vote for them based on nonideological grounds.
The second e¤ect is that the ideological stances of the voters are highly dependent on the position of the candidates, which in turn depend on their qualities. High quality candidates are more likely to persuade voters that their position is the ideal one relative to their lower-quality rivals. These two strategies have opposing e¤ects on the estimated parameter capturing sensitivity to ideological distance. Voter endogeneity is found to overstate the value of ideological di¤erences to a voter's utility. Candidates endogeneity is found to underestimate the value of ideological di¤erence. The latter e¤ect dominates the former causing a naive estimation to underestimate a voter's sensitivity to ideological di¤erences.
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